Abstract In this survey and position paper, we discuss some issues in logical modeling of interactive behavior. We draw together a number of lines in current logics for social action, emphasizing uses of 'small models' rather than complex spaces.
It is easy to come up with cases in daily life where such considerations about behavior are crucial, even though they need not be fully explicit in one's mind. One systematic approach are the solution procedures of game theory. But similar issues persist:
Example 2 Let two players A, E play the following simple extensive game, with their pay-offs at the endpoints marked in the order (value for A, value for E):
A 2, 0 E 0, 1 A
1, 0 E

0, 4 3, 3
Here, the well-known solution algorithm of Backward Induction recommends moving left at each stage of the game. Thus, strikingly, player A will opt out at the start. But there is another plausible line of reasoning. If A goes right, then player E can only make sense of this by assuming that A expects to get the outcome 3, 3. 1 But this will change E's behavior: she will now play right at her first turn, and if A in fact expected 3, 3, he will choose right once more. What happens at the end is up for grabs. You may think that E will go left, callously disregarding A -if this is a competitive game.
But labels like competitive or cooperative are not all that useful in social scenarios.
Many real-life settings are a bit of both: think of academic life. We want logics that can analyze scenarios like this without agents knowing which general label applies. 
In this paper, we will not propose any definitive solution for the above cases. Instead, we see them as exemplars for an area of reasoning that we will explore along the following lines. Any game-like activity can be divided into three meaningful phases:
Before, During, and After. We start with Before, looking at Backward Induction as a prior method of deliberation creating expectations about a social scenario. This can be done in several different logical formats, each of independent interest, and we point out some interesting open problems. Next, we look at the During phase, discussing logics for updating players' information and beliefs as a game proceeds. One natural highlight here is Forward Induction as a form of belief revision in perfect information games, but we also discuss the natural issue of observational powers for various types of players in imperfect information games. We will not say much about the final After phase of analyzing or rationalizing a game already played, but the logical techniques that we introduce would also work for such scenarios. One more technical theme in logical modeling throughout this paper is the use of 'small models' close to simple reasoning patters, as opposed to huge spaces pre-encoding all possible developments.
In addition, we provide a large number of asides that draw the reader's attention to
further issues and open problems in the area. Finally, this tour of the area does not add up to one systematic theory. While we may be seeing the contours of a 'Theory of
Play ' (van Benthem 2011A) , this promised land is still beyond the horizon here.
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The following picture illustrates more concretely what this says:
The shaded area is the part that can be reached via further play with our strategy.
The logical form of best action Backward Induction produces, among all my moves, my best actions. It makes sense to throw away the ladder of the above procedure, trying to capture this style of reasoning directly. One natural candidate is a modal game logic with (i) modalities <a>ϕ for moves as binary relations a on nodes in the game tree ('playing a, one can reach a node where ϕ holds'), and (ii) a preference modality <pref i >ϕ ('player i prefers some node where ϕ holds to the current one'). In terms of this language, a standard modal frame correspondence argument (cf. This logic of best action fits in a current trend toward investigating simple top-level modal logics for reasoning about complex underlying normative notions. Still, a complete axiomatization of this system is unknown (cf. van Benthem 2011C).
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Definition 7 Public announcement.
Announcements !ϕ of a true formula ϕ transform models (M, s) with actual world s into submodels (M|ϕ, s) whose domain consists of those worlds in M that satisfied ϕ.
Moreover, crucial for dynamic epistemic changes, in the new model, truth values of rat statements may have changed, so announcing it again makes sense.
Example 8 Solving games by iterated announcement of rationality.
Consider a game with three turns, four branches, and pay-offs in the order A, E:
The BI path emerges step by step. Announcing rat once rules out point u (the only one where rat fails), announcing it again rules out z and the node above it (now points where rat fails), and the final stage rules out y and the node above it. In the resulting game tree, rat holds throughout -it has become common knowledge, one might say:
Stable limit models (!ϕ, M)
# are always reached in iterated announcement procedures.
In particular, this process captures Backward Induction (van Benthem 2007B):
Theorem 9
In any game tree M, the limit submodel (!rat, M) # produced by iterated announcement of rationality rat is the history computed by the BI algorithm.
This limit perspective applies in principle to any sort of informational process. Repeated plausibility upgrade with rationality Backward Induction can also be seen as creating expectations rather than knowledge. Then we need a 'soft update' that rearranges plausibility between worlds. A key example is the following operation:
Definition 10 Radical upgrade.
Radical upgrade ⇑ϕ makes all ϕ-worlds best in a current plausibility model, and puts all ¬ϕ-worlds underneath, while keeping the old ordering inside these two zones.
The driving force this time is the usual notion of rationality in games. A move x for player i dominates its sibling y in beliefs if the most plausible end nodes reachable after x along any path in the whole game tree are all better for i than all most plausible end nodes reachable in the game after y. Rationality-in-beliefs is then the assertion rat * No player plays a move that is dominated in beliefs.
Now we perform a relation change ⇑rat * that is like a radical upgrade:
If x dominates y in beliefs, make all end nodes from x more plausible than those reachable from y, keeping the old order inside these zones.
This changes plausibility order, and hence the dominance pattern, so iteration makes sense. Here are the stages in our earlier game, with x, y, z for end nodes or histories:
Thus, we have now linked social reasoning to information update and belief revision. Forward Induction (Battigalli & Sinischalci 2002 , Perea 2011 ). We will return to this procedure later, in terms of logical models for the belief revision at work here.
Spaces of hypotheses about others
But rationalization is not always the preferred method during play. In other scenarios, hypotheses about players can be very different.
We may know that we are playing against a finite machine, or an overworked colleague, and to optimize our own strategy, we need to find out how much memory it has available. Van Benthem 2011A discusses a taxonomy of hypotheses about players, needed to tame the explosion of options that arise in a more general Theory of Play.
Small models versus large models These options in thinking about social behavior also have a technical counterpart in a basic point of logical modeling. Game-theorists tie Forward Induction to solution algorithms on strategic games such as iterated removal of weakly dominated strategies (Brandenburger 2007 , Perea 2011 This language can define strategic powers for players in games. But in addition to this action view, there is also the earlier 'future knowledge'. Adding a general term move for the union of all specific moves, <move * >ϕ is a description of the modal-epistemic future, running over all positions that can still be reached by further play. Unlike most epistemic logics in game theory, this is S4 knowledge with reflexive and transitive accessibility, fitting the temporal character of information about the future.
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Looking backward While the modal logic PDL looks forward in time, there is also a case for looking backward. Consider the BI strategy as analyzed earlier by announcing the statement rat which said that a node is not the result of a mistake, passing through a dominated move. This looks backward and we would add a converse modality <a ∪ >ϕ there is a node with ϕ reaching the current node by an a move Given the structure of trees, we can then also define an operator Y for 'yesterday', plus
propositional constants marking what last move was played (if we are not in the root).
Another new definable expression is counterfactuals, since this extended language can talk about what would be the case if we had chose different moves in the past.
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From nodes to histories: temporal logics Modal languages typically express local properties of nodes in a game tree. But when reasoning about long-term social action, one talks about global histories that unfold over time. Now PDL can still do part of this job. The earlier modality <move * >ϕ already acted like a temporal assertion that at some history at some stage, ϕ will be the case. But we also want to say things like ∃Gϕ along some future history ϕ will always be the case.
This is still definable in PDL on finite trees, as programs can express the statement 'until some endpoint, ϕ is always the case' (van Benthem 2002). In infinite games, the temporal modality becomes stronger, and we need an extension of PDL that can talk about infinite branches, such as the µ-calculus. 12 But there are alternatives:
Game trees are also models for a branching temporal logic where 'worlds' are complete histories of the game. In tree-like models for branching time, a ubiquitous structure, 'legal histories' h represent possible evolutions of a given game. At each stage of the game, players are in a node s on some actual history of events whose past they know, either completely or partially, but whose future is yet to be fully revealed:
This can be described in a language with temporal operators plus 'branch knowledge', where s ∩ <a> is the partial history arising when event a occurs after stage s:
In this language, as moves are played publicly, players' knowledge adapts:
Fact 12
The following principle is valid:
Here 'T' stands for a tautology. Indices of evaluation are history-point pairs (h, s)
rather than local stages -but we will mainly stick with the latter in this paper. Public announcements !ϕ are defined using world elimination from (M, s) to (M|ϕ, s) as in Definition 7, now to the above tree models with stages serving as worlds.
Update actions during play
Reduction axioms for dynamic logics
We can analyze the effects of these basic actions explicitly on top of our static game languages, by adding the usual modalities
[!e] and [!ϕ].
For the first operator, we need not do anything special:
14 The second operator yields to standard techniques, via recursion axioms:
Theorem 15 The logic of public announcement in game trees is axiomatizable.
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The recursion axioms for atoms and Boolean operators are as usual. Here is the law for the action modality. For convenience, we use existential versions:
Interestingly, the case of iteration (and hence also of future knowledge) <!ϕ><a * >ψ is a bit less obvious, since we now need to make sure that we run along ϕ-points only.
To state the right law, we must move to PDL with test:
But then, we really need to show that PDL as a whole has reduction laws for public announcement.
The following technical folklore result shows this:
Fact 16
The logic PDL is closed under relativization.
In particular, we have the following principle generalizing the above:
Here |ϕ is a recursive operation on PDL-programs π surrounding every occurrence of an atomic move a with tests to obtain ?ϕ ; a ; ?ϕ.
As noted earlier, PDL has a further virtue of explicitly defining strategies as programs.
Thus, we also obtain recursion laws for strategy modalities (cf. van Benthem 2010 for details). As we saw with the BI strategy, we need converse action modalities to define rationality, but Theorem 15 is easily extended to PDL with a converse operator.
This same style of analysis applies to the above-mentioned temporal languages. As an example, here is a reduction law for the earlier additional branch modality ∃G:
This is just one instance of connecting public announcement with temporal logics. Finally, our update analysis also applies to beliefs as subrelations of the move relation.
The recursion axioms of van Benthem 2007A then hold for public announcement.
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Game trees are an appealing first model for social action. Simple dynamic logics of actions and information change describe play when the game is common knowledge, while beliefs of players match subsets of the move relation. The result is a mix of ideas from dynamic and temporal logic (Stirling 1993 , van Benthem & Pacuit 2006 .
Procedural information and epistemic forests
Now that we know what game trees can do for us, we go to more complex models.
Lifting to forest models Suppose we do not know what strategies are played by others, but we have some prior idea. Then tree models may not suffice (van Benthem 2011C):
Example 17 Strategic uncertainty.
In the following game, let A know that E will play the same move throughout: A
E E
Then all four histories are still possible. But A only considers two future trees, viz.
A A E E E E
In longer games, this difference in modeling can be very important. Observing only one move by E will tell A exactly what E's strategy will be in the whole game. An epistemic forest model M is a family of finite sequences h of events taken from some given set E, related by extension with further events (the possible moves), and also by epistemic accessibility relations ~i for agents i. There is also a valuation map V from proposition letters to those finite sequences h where they hold.
The finite histories encode possible stages of a process that goes from available sequences to longer ones. This need not form a single tree, as there may be different (views of) processes under consideration. The epistemic uncertainty links make agents uncertain where they are in which process -which can be for many different reasons.
These structures have more generality than we just asked for. So far, inside games, we do not want uncertainties about the stage one is in. We are still talking about perfect information games, but we may not know exactly which one, or how it is played. (ii) standard K-type knowledge, perhaps from other sources.
The logic will show us how these can interact, and we will see an example below.
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But one can also use temporal languages interpreting formulas at history-point pairs (h, t) as before. The modal and temporal approaches to epistemic forest structure seem close, though I am not aware of any definitive analysis of their precise connections. 18 The agent condition of Fact 18 can typically be defined in such a modal logic of action and uncertainty, using nominals to denote unique finite histories h. A similar analysis can be given for public announcements !ϕ of relevant facts. These change an epistemic forest model in the same style as before.
Theorem 23
The dynamic logic of public announcement on epistemic forest models is completely axiomatizable.
The only new feature is the recursion law for the new knowledge operator. But it is easy to see that it is just the standard one of public announcement logic:
Discussion: internalized announcements In the preceding dynamics, epistemic forest models change. In particular, public announcements simplify the initial forest, perhaps even to just one tree. However, this is not the usual view of these models as Grand
Stage accounts of every event that can happen in a given information scenario. On the latter view, public announcements become 'internalized' to events that can happen inside the game, already marked inside the forest model (cf. the 'protocol models' of Hoshi 2009). We will not undertake a comparison between the two views.
We have shown how epistemic forest models can be updated in two ways: with new facts about where we stand in the action structure of a game, but also with global procedural information about the structure of the game as a whole. Our models support a variety of representation languages, of which we have mentioned a few. 19 The style of analysis given here also works for our next class of game models, where knowledge and information play in yet another way, while updates can be much more delicate. 
Coda: related frameworks
Observation uncertainty and imperfect information games
We have now dealt with perfect information games, and uncertainty about how they are played. The next step are games with imperfect information, where players may not know exactly where they are in the game tree. The intuitive source for this kind of uncertainty is not procedural ignorance about the game one is in, but limitations on players' powers of observation or memory. There is a large literature on these games, and we just lightly review a few salient points from van Benthem 2001, 2011C.
Example 24 Partial observation in games.
In this imperfect information game, the dotted line marks player E's uncertainty about her position when her turn comes. She does not know the move played by player A:
A local epistemic action language Structures like this interpret a combined dynamic-
epistemic language extending that of Section 5 on game trees. For instance, after A plays move a in the root, in both middle states, E knows 'de dicto' that playing c or d
will give her p -as the disjunction <c>p ∨ <d>p is true at both middle states:
On the other hand, there is no specific move of which E knows 'de re' at this stage that it will guarantee a p-outcome -and this shows in the truth of the formula
¬K E <c>p ∧ ¬K E <d>p
Such distinctions are typical when action and knowledge combine for agents.
Strategies and knowledge A striking new feature of our game is 'non-determinacy'.
E's playing the opposite of player A is a strategy guaranteeing outcome p in the underlying perfect information game -but it is unusable now, since E cannot tell what A played. We want uniform strategies prescribing the same move at indistinguishable nodes. But then E has no strategy for forcing p, while A has no strategy forcing ¬p.
Uniformity of strategies is guaranteed by special 'knowledge programs' in the combined epistemic dynamic language over these games (cf. Fagin et al. 1995) , whose test conditions for actions are propositions that an agent knows to be true or false. The game of Example 24 has Perfect Recall, but No Miracles fails: E suddenly knows where she is after she played her move. Let us now make this dynamics explicit.
Styles of play and types of player
Imperfect information games and dynamic-epistemic logic Observation uncertainty is
the typical province of dynamic-epistemic logics (Baltag, Moss & Solecki 1998 , van Ditmarsch, van der Hoek & Kooi 2007 . Here partly private events occur that may be observed differently by different agents, as encoded in 'event models' E that form products with current epistemic models M. We will not give any details of this 'product update' framework here, but merely mention one result that also points to a connection with the epistemic forest models of the preceding section.
Which imperfect information games are playable by agents powered by DEL?
Theorem 26 An extensive imperfect information game is isomorphic to an iterated The total picture: epistemic forest models once more Imperfect information games as logical models fit quite well into the epistemic forest models of the preceding section.
Again they are a special case, but now virtually the opposite of an earlier one:
Fact 27 Epistemic forest models for imperfect information games satisfy this Example 28 Trade-off.
Intuitively, the following two models seem close (Pacuit 2007 . van Benthem 2009 :
Indeed, in a branching temporal language, many assertions can be translated across. ■ In summary, we have seen that epistemic forests combine all sources of knowledge and ignorance in games: branching future, procedural information, and observation or memory. They support dynamic epistemic temporal languages that express elaborate scenarios of social action. But most of all, moving stepwise, we have shown how much fine-structure there is in the stages of coming to this most general framework.
Yet more complex models of games Epistemic forests are not the last word in the literature on logic and games. There are also more complex abstract epistemic game models M = (W, ~i, V) (cf. Stalnaker 1999) whose worlds carry local information about all nodes in a game G, plus strategy profiles specifying each player's behavior 21 throughout the game. Players' information about structure and procedure is then encoded by uncertainty relations ~i between worlds. We will not discuss here just how this extends epistemic forests, or for what sorts of discourse this step upward is really needed -one instance are complex counterfactual assertions about strategies.
From knowledge to belief
Here is a natural test on the preceding styles of modeling knowledge. They also make sense for beliefs: as we have seen, the more common fuel driving games and social action. To show this, we will walk lightly along some earlier topics.
Belief in tree models Our first sort of knowledge in games was based on branching game trees. If we want to represent belief in the same models, there is a difference:
expectations about the future seem largely about the future history, not single nodes.
This can be modeled in the same style as for the temporal language of Section 5, using an earlier-mentioned device for dealing with belief. We add binary relations ≤ i of relative plausibility between histories, and then interpret a doxastic modality:
M, h, s |= <B, i>φ iff M, h', s |= φ for some history h' coinciding with h
up to stage s and most plausible for i according to the given relation ≤ i .
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Moving along a history, the plausibility relations encode belief changes for players like the ones we saw with Backward Induction in Section 3. This now shows in the logic, provided we also add an operator for conditional beliefs:
, s |= φ for some history h' coinciding with h up to stage s and most plausible for i among all future histories satisfying ψ.
We just state the next result to show how a temporal logic of belief works. Here the modal-temporal operator F a says that the current branch starts with an a move:
Fact 29 The following principles are valid for belief change:
For similar observations in the setting of analyzing AGM theory, see Bonanno 2007 , and for more extensive study of doxastic-temporal languages, see Dégrémont 2010.
Belief among moves after all? In Section 3, Backward Induction constructed the plausibility ordering relations that were just taken as primitives in the above doxastictemporal models. In the BI procedure as we analyzed it, plausibility relations matched strategies viewed as subrelations best of 'best action' inside the total move relation (Fact 5). But with such a local encoding of global plausibility, we can have a language for belief adding just a modality <best> to a propositional dynamic logic over game trees (Section 2). Then, for instance, we can extend the epistemic PDL strategies of Section 7 to doxastic ones involving belief conditions. Still, is this view reasonable? It becomes hard to define conditional beliefs, since we need gradations among non-best moves. But a more important objection is the uniformity imposed by the BI-algorithm:
Example 30 Crossing expectations.
Recall the following picture from Example 1, but this time, with the numbers at the outcomes read, not as utility values, but as degrees of plausibility:
This pattern goes against the 'node-compatible' plausibility order for BI in Section 3, which makes one of the moves l, r more plausible than the other, while all their later outcomes follow this earlier decision. Yet it is easy to think of scenarios where the 'crossing' plausibility order depicted here is natural, and hence our general doxastictemporal models seem the right level of generality. The special uniform plausibility relations produced by the BI algorithm induce a definable subclass satisfying a special axiom in the doxastic-temporal language, whose details we do not spell out here.
■ From trees to epistemic-doxastic forests The same reasons that applied to knowledge also motivate a step from game trees to more complex epistemic doxastic forest models. First, agents may have beliefs rather than knowledge about the structure of the game. They may also have beliefs about other agents' different beliefs or knowledge.
And finally, extending imperfect information games, they may have restricted powers of observation that generate beliefs in addition to knowledge about where they are in a game tree. For the resulting models and their temporal logics, see Dégrémont 2010.
Update actions As before, there are dynamic logics that describe effects on epistemic doxastic forest models of the key acts of observing moves and public announcements.
In particular, public announcements now find a use in analyzing the earlier procedure of Forward Induction (cf. Example 2 and Sections 2, 3). When we observe a move e, then, taking e to be rational gives information about the active player i's beliefs: they are such as to make e rational in beliefs. Or more succinctly, the update is for Belief versus expectations The only point we make here is a conceptual one. In our treatment of knowledge, but even more clearly with belief, we are really modeling two different notions. The first, inside game trees, is expectation about the future course of the game, the other, between trees, may be called belief proper (about the process, about other agents). Though the two notions are close, and both involve plausibility comparisons, the distinction seems useful and illuminating. Perhaps the usual broad category 'belief' is not fine-grained enough to understand strategic social behavior. what is the natural repertoire of such local events in the actual course of a game?
Modeling behavior in the presence of belief is a matter of conceptual analysis as much as logical technique. Once we have achieved the former, the latter will be forthcoming.
29 Using ⇑ has the additional virtue that we can now make sense of any move, even those that are not rationalizable. A radical update for rationality in beliefs will put those worlds on top where the latter property holds, but when there are no such worlds, it will leave the plausibility order the same. What happens in that case is just a bare observation of the move. Of course, this minimal procedure does not solve the issue of how to solve conflicts in our interpretation of behavior, which may involve other updates in terms of changing preferences (Liu 2011).
30 One obvious further issue is to which extent the stated update scenarios on forest models can be compressed downward to work on just game trees with plausibility orderings, the way things were with Backward Induction. Indeed one can give rough versions of Forward Induction where a plausibility order gets created directly on branches. For instance, start from a flat plausibility order, and consider successive nodes in the game tree, where possible moves partition the reachable outcomes. Upgrade all partition cells using a radical upgrade for the set of outcomes that majorize, for the active player, at least one outcome for an alter-native move.
(What gets demoted out of the 'belief range' in this way are those outcomes that would be bad no matter what.) It is of interest to apply this simple procedure to the game of Example 2. We leave a precise statement of these simplified methods for later work.
As we said at the start, this paper is a survey of some of the many logical models for games and social action, trying to see some connecting themes. 32 Our main point has been that this variety is not a drawback, but an asset. Instead of looking for huge worst-case models wearing winter clothes in summer, it seems better to let relevant scenarios dictate the things you want to capture, at the right level of lightness.
There is much more to the story of fine-structure and natural steps in game modeling than what we have been able to address in this paper, and more can be said also about combining existing frameworks (cf. van Benthem 2012 for further themes). In what follows, we mention a few points that deserve further study in our grand picture.
Dynamics and pre-encoding It has been suggested that making the dynamics of play explicit, as we have done, is a natural complement to looking for small models (cf. Transforming different models There is a persistent intuition that the different kinds of knowledge that we have distinguished can be turned into each other through some sort of representation. For instance, we discussed turning 'future ignorance' based on branching in a game tree into uncertainty between histories in the style of epistemic logic? There exist some folklore results to this effect (cf. van Benthem 2009 that also support some translations at the level of the above languages. But I am not aware of a systematic study clarifying just how far these changes in perspective go.
Game change While the entanglement of action, knowledge, belief and preference in social reasoning is an exciting force behind this paper, the resulting notions may be very fragile. Changing a game a little bit may result in dramatic shifts in its strategic equilibria, and earlier best behavior may easily fall apart. While our logics provide tools for reasoning about many game changes, it is clear that we do not yet understand the true continuities and discontinuities in changing social scenarios. We see this long list of things to do as a virtue of the 'slow steps' analysis in modeling for games that we have proposed. Taking the perspective of this paper draws together ideas from many logical frameworks, and it makes us see new issues all around.
Long-term behavior
